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INTRODUCTION
How should one construct optimal property rules in high-technology mar-
kets? The task is far from straightforward, given the prodigious rates of innova-
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tion in the field.' In such a rapidly evolving environment, policymakers must
approach many issues de novo. From an Internet service provider's desire to
control activity on its servers to a pharmaceutical company's efforts to frustrate
the emergence of generic drugs, lawmakers face an eclectic and ever-evolving
array of scenarios.2 In the new economy,3 such fundamental concepts as owner-
ship, exclusivity, and alienability prove controversial and unsettled. Ideally, po-
licymakers could look to related areas of law for guidance. The most obvious
candidate would be the law governing real property, but, at first blush, these
traditional principles seem far removed from the reality of high-tech markets.
Nevertheless, some commentators see prescriptive parallels in the rules
properly brought to bear on owners of physical and intellectual property.4 This
analogy can provide normative guidance in even the most difficult cases. An In-
ternet service provider should be free to control its own servers but should lack
means to control communal hubs, in much the same way that homeowners can
enjoy exclusive possession of their domiciles while also being required to share
communal rights of access with others.' A person's right to alienate her intellec-
tual property should be as free and unfettered as the right to alienate person-
alty.6 At its core, the invocation of traditional property rules might suggest that
intrusion upon an exclusive right be met with an unqualified ability to enjoin
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 246 (2d ed. 2001) (observing the ex-
traordinarily rapid pace of innovation in the new economy).
2. Compare Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (denying Intel the right to
enjoin use of its servers by a former employee), with C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1553 (20o6) (detailing pioneer drug manufacturers' efforts to protect their
markets by excluding generic entry).
3. The "new economy" refers to markets that sell information goods in nontangible
form. Intellectual property features prominently in this setting, given that most
information goods are protected by patent or copyright.
4. See Richard Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property: A
Response to Peter Menell, 3o REGULATION 58 (20o8). See generally Mark Lemley &
Phil Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 783 (2007) (discussing the circumstances in which strong rights to exclude,
often found in real property settings, should be applied to the intellectual do-
main); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713 (2007) (criticiz-
ing the property rights movement).
5. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 60.
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.0 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/o558.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES]
(regarding "intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other
form of property" and advocating the efficiency benefits of licensing).
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that activity. In short, one possessing intellectual property should be as free to
exclude others as a homeowner is to eject a trespasser from her property7
If one incorporates this principle of property law into the law of patents, it
becomes easier to espouse specific and consistent rules in the face of evolving
technology. The ultimate question, of course, is whether the importation of
laws developed with respect to tangible property is proper. This Article seeks to
add a new perspective to this debate by focusing on an acute distinction be-
tween real and intellectual property. The legal rights associated with tangible
property are generally secure, but it is well-settled that patentees enjoy no more
than probabilistic rights-they hold lottery tickets that may or may not yield
exclusive power.8 This asymmetry produces a variety of normative limitations
and qualifications on an analogy between these related, yet distinct, bodies of
law.
As a general matter, the issue of certainty implicates both the epistemologi-
cal and consequential qualities of ownership and should inform the optimal
construction of property rights accordingly. The Article draws two specific con-
clusions. First, there may be good normative ground for tempering the exclu-
sive rights properly associated with highly probabilistic intellectual property
rights. Second, in an environment of free contract, one should be concerned
that a patentee may be able to transform the aoristic right granted to it by Con-
gress into a certain one, thus deriving a greater pecuniary return than was in-
herent in the "patent bargain." The legitimacy and scope of the power to ex-
clude lie at the heart of this transformative process, creating a spectrum that
charts a direct association between patent certainty and freedom of contract.
Indeterminism thus bears significant repercussions for the property-patent
equation. This Article charts the positive source of the divergence in determin-
ism between intellectual and tangible property and explores the normative re-
percussions of that departure for the formulation of both substantive patent law
and ideal restraints on freedom of contract. The capricious nature of intellectual
property rights need not strip the property-patent equation of all legitimacy.
Rather, the temptation to borrow wholesale from the law governing real prop-
erty must be met with sensitivity for the distinctions between the property char-
acteristics at issue.
Nevertheless, it is easy to exaggerate the differences between these two bod-
ies of law. The idea that traditional property law invariably grants unyielding
rights to exclude others is mistaken. Far from Blackstone's famous depiction of
a property right as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
7. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y io8, 109 (199o) ("Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of tres-
pass does with real property. Intellectual property is intangible, but the right to
exclude is no different in principle from General Motors' right to exclude Ford
from using its assembly line ....").
8. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 75 (2005).
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any other individual in the universe,"9 the body of law that actually has devel-
oped is quite flexible.' Even in the domain of real property, the law does not
grant an unqualified right to injunctive relief in all circumstances. Rather, it in-
troduces a liability rule in high-transaction cost environments where the cost of
bargaining would exceed the benefit, as well as in cases of uncertainty, which
are not systemic in physical property but nevertheless exist in some form." The
world of physical property thus bears witness to a rich body of law, upon which
policymakers in the intellectual setting can draw readily. Strong property rights,
of course, play an important role with respect to both tangible and intellectual
property, but their limitations should be apparent in both settings. By constru-
ing the property-patent equation in such terms, one can appreciate that even
cases that which strip patentees of an automatic right to injunctive relief, are en-
tirely consistent with traditional principles of ownership.
Part I of the Article explores the relationship between intellectual and real
property and the nature of the "right to exclude" that is typically thought to de-
fine property rights, and it explains how that exclusivity is less inflexible than
often is thought. Given traditional property law's embrace of liability rules in
appropriate circumstances, it follows than an analogy between physical and in-
tellectual property does not suggest that injunctions always should be awarded
in cases of patent infringement. The heart of the Article lies in Part II, which ob-
serves the high level of uncertainty associated with patents and explains the
normative consequences of that indeterminism for a patentee's right to exclude
rivals. It also considers the limits that should be placed on patentees' attempts
to secure their probabilistic property rights. Part III considers how the stochas-
tic nature of today's patents could be improved but explains that some residual
uncertainty is inevitable. Nevertheless, such a low level of indeterminism may
be without significant normative consequence. A brief conclusion follows.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE
RIGHT To EXCLUDE
A. The Property-Patent Equation
I. The Relationship Between Intellectual and Real Property
Despite the obvious contextual differences between intellectual and physi-
cal property, there is no question that their analogy has been both influential
and widely received. The Patent Act provides that "patents shall have the attrib-
9. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
io. See infra Section I.B.
11. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Ca-
thedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 450-51 (1995); Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical
Observations from Behavioral Studies, 8o TEx. L. REV. 219, 220 (2001).
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utes of personal property."'2 The Supreme Court has noted that "patents...
have long been considered a species of property."' 3 The Justice Department and
Federal Trade Commission's influential antitrust guidelines on the licensing of
intellectual property stress the importance of this relationship.' 4 And the right
of a patentee to enjoin infringement of its claimed invention-surely the defini-
tive characteristic of a property right-has been recognized and respected,15 at
least until recently.'
6
There are many parallels to draw between physical and intellectual property
rules. In both cases, private ownership spurs desirable rates of investment and
consumption. With respect to land, economists have warned of the tragedy of
the commons that can arise in the absence of private property rights. In such
situations, each consumer fails to internalize the full social cost of his consump-
tion.17 This yields excessive use and results in long-run degradation of the rele-
vant resource.'" Similarly, a rational actor has little incentive to devote her lim-
ited resources to improving a piece of land when others are free to appropriate
the value of her labor. As a result, the law recognizes a property right in tangible
property, which allows owners to internalize the value of their actions. '9 Such
internalization causes their actions to mirror the social optimum." The defini-
tive characteristic of such property rights, of course, is the right to exclude. In
12. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2oo6).
13. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642
(1999).
14. See GUIDELINES, supra note 6.
15. See, e.g., George M. Sirilla et al., Will eBay Bring Down the Curtain on Automatic
Injunctions in Patent Cases?, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 587, 594 (20o6) (noting that the then-
applicable rule that injunctions should generally issue upon a showing of in-
fringement "reflects the long-held belief that the right to exclude is inherent in a
patent").
16. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (20o6).
17. See D. Benjamin Barros, Group Size, Heterogeneity, and Prosocial Behavior: Design-
ing Legal Structures to Facilitate Cooperation in a Diverse Society, 18 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 203, 216-17 (20o8).
18. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968).
19. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-20
(2004).
20. In practice, it is impossible to internalize fully the benefits of one's investment in
land. Passersby and other third parties derive utility from improvements. As a re-
sult, the Blackstonian view of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclu-
sion of the right of any other individual in the universe," BLACKSTONE, supra note
9, at *2, is unattainable in practice. Thus, positive externalities exist, and even pri-
vate ownership yields suboptimal rates of investment.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
particular, that exclusivity equates to injunctive relief in the case of trespass, so
that a person may enjoy her property "in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe."2"
In the case of intellectual property, much of the same reasoning applies.
Valuable information is costly to produce yet difficult to maintain exclusive
control of and cheap to disseminate." The result is that unbridled markets will
undercompensate inventors, leading to suboptimal rates of investment in "Sci-
ence and useful Arts."23 As with realty and personalty, bestowing the inventors
of useful, nonobvious, and novel technologies with property rights allows them
to internalize the social gains of their scientific contributions and devote socially
desirable levels of investment to the innovative process.2 4
Yet acceptance of the property-patent equation has been far from ubiqui-
tous. According to Professor Peter Menell, the fields of real and intellectual
property "derive from different philosophical foundations, embody different
rules and institutions, and reflect different political constituencies." 5 Similarly,
Richard Stallman-an outspoken critic of the concept of intellectual property-
considers that the reference to information as "property" operates as "a catch-
all to lump together disparate laws" that "originated separately, evolved differ-
ently, cover different activities, have different rules, and raise different public
policy issues."26
In practice, those who debate the virtues of analogizing the two fields of law
typically divide into proponents of either property or liability rules. 7 A property
right is typically defined as ownership that confers an absolute power to control
the use and disposition of an asset." Use of the asset by others necessarily is
21. Id.
22. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 631-32 (2002).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Again, it should be noted that full internalization of an invention's value is impos-
sible. This is particularly true in the intellectual domain, where valuable informa-
tion is notoriously difficult to maintain to the exclusion of third parties. Unlike
with the case of tangible property, however, there are overriding considerations in
favor of full, unfettered dissemination once a certain financial return has been ac-
quired. Thus, it is generally true that we do not want inventors to internalize the
full social value of their inventions.
25. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, 30 REGU-
LATION 36, 38 (2007).
26. Richard M. Stallman, Did You Say "Intellectual Property"? It's a Seductive Mirage
(Sept. 27, 2009), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.xhtml.
27. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(providing the definitive discussion on the proper circumstances in which prop-
erty and liability rules should be employed).
28. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 1o6 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997).
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contingent on the owner's consent.2 9 A liability rule, in contrast, strips an owner
of the ability to exclude others, so that anyone can consume the relevant re-
source upon payment of a price deemed appropriate by some third party.3"
The debate has yielded great discord, but neither legal regime has achieved
hegemony. The property rights movement (PRM) advocates powerful rights to
exclude, which yield significant ex ante incentives to innovate and facilitate effi-
cient Coasian bargaining through contract.' Others promote the primacy of li-
ability rules, stressing the transaction costs associated with pervasive bargaining,
the threat of strategic hold-out, and the search costs inherent in a law that
grants an inventor an unqualified right to exclude-all shortcomings deemed
endemic in property rules.3" In turn, the PRM criticizes the enforcement di-
lemma inherent in the liability approach, given the theoretical difficulty of de-
fining an optimal access price and the inevitable and disproportionate social
cost of attempting to estimate it in practice.33 Property rights advocates further
note that such fears such as irrational hold-out-most often voiced in the con-
text of patent thickets and experimental use-are not supported by empirical
evidence.34 Instead, strong, overlapping property rights give rise to their own
solution through patent pools, portfolio cross-licenses, standard-setting organi-
zations (SSOs), and invent-around. 35
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Some commentators also note that powerful rights to exclude are deontologically
justified, although it is widely accepted that a purely utilitarian calculus informs
the construction of patent rules. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infra-
structure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 53-54 (20o8) ("The Supreme Court has recognized
that 'the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technolo-
gies into the public domain through disclosure.' While acknowledging the valu-
able contributions of inventors, the Court has accordingly rejected any moral
rights or Lockean labor theory justifications for granting patents." (footnotes
omitted)).
32. See generally Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Informa-
tion Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2o63, 2o68-69 (2000) (contrasting the virtues
of public and private ordering).
33. See Epstein, supra note 28.
34. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven-
tions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 719-27 (2001) (arguing that patents do not create a
hold-out problem but in fact promote innovation and commercialization).
35. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J.
COMPETITION L. & EcON. 915, 963 (20o8). Patent pools are entities that accumu-
late and license blocking patents. They serve a valuable role in bypassing the un-
desirable economic phenomenon of royalty stacking, which can hinder or even
prevent the commercialization of technologies that require the use of intellectual
property-protected information. Sometimes a small number of companies that
possess large patent portfolios can achieve the same result by cross-licensing one
another. SSOs are comprised of industry participants and seek to agree on a
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Despite the controversy, most scholars accept the primacy of property rules
in situations where few transacting parties are involved and where strategic
hold-out is absent.36 In such settings, liability rules foster an environment of
costly ex post litigation over indeterminate concepts of "reasonable" royalty
rates, frustrate efficient contracting, and create a systemic risk of patentee un-
dercompensation.37
A crucial question, therefore, is whether traditional principles of land law
incorporate liability or property rules. If one wishes to draw an analogy between
the laws governing intellectual and real property, the rules sought to be incor-
porated by that analogy must be understood. As explored below, the idea that
the law of real property is synonymous with a property rule is mistaken.
2. The Property-Patent Equation as a Right To Exclude
At its most fundamental, the equation between patents and physical prop-
erty might imply that the law should provide the holders of each with inviolable
exclusive rights, the breach of which gives rise to automatic injunctive relief. As
this Section explains, however, this analogy does not support such a conclusion.
Instead, a critical review of real property law reveals that a liability rule may be
the optimal result in certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, patent law long reflected the view that infringement should
result in an absolute right to exclude. Indeed, in a 2005 decision subsequently
reversed by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit opined: "Because the 'right
to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property,'
the general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
common standard for all in an industry to use. They typically are used in situa-
tions where a number of possible standards can be employed. Free market compe-
tition to establish a dominant standard involves wasteful, "winner-takes-all" ri-
valry, which can be avoided through the SSO process.
36. Hold-out is a tactic in which a patentee withholds its proprietary claims until in-
dustry lock-in allows it to appropriate a greater pecuniary return than was inher-
ent in its ex ante technological contribution. See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To
Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 153-
54 (2007).
37. Note that numerous courts have recognized the dangers inherent in a liability ap-
proach. See, e.g., Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (E.D.
Va. 1998) ("[W]ere an injunction not to issue[, the patentee] would suffer signifi-
cant irreparable harm, namely the loss of its statutory right to license or not to li-
cense its patent to whomever it wishes."); Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 6Ol F.
Supp. 964, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("[M]onetary damages are generally considered to
be inadequate. This inadequacy results from the nature of the patent right itself-
the right to exclude others."). While such cases are sound in principle, they can be
criticized insofar as they facilitate the extraction of rents by patentees of a value
reflective of ex post lock-in, rather than ex ante value in the presence of choice.
28:61 2009
INDETERMINISM AND THE PROPERTY-PATENT EQUATION
validity have been adjudged."" The rationale for allowing the owner of physical
or intellectual property to enjoin trespass is important. As noted, the alternative
to an injunction is monetary relief, which threatens to undercompensate prop-
erty holders by providing them with less than would have induced them to li-
cense ex ante and creates ex post litigation costs over nebulous concepts of
"proper" damages.3 9
The Supreme Court recently dealt the property-patent equation a crushing
blow-at least if one interprets that analogy as requiring the incorporation of a
property rule. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court stripped a patent-
holder of the very right that is ostensibly guaranteed to it by the Patent Act-
namely, the right to exclude. 4° More specifically, it held that a patentee does not
enjoy a presumptive right to injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement
but must instead satisfy the traditional equitable factors that support such a re-
medy.4 This unanimous holding flew in the face of those who had urged the
Court in an amicus brief to treat patent rights as one would treat tangible prop-
erty and recognize the right to exclude as largely sacrosanct in both cases.42 The
Court's unequivocal rejection of that stance undermined the property rights
movement and, quite understandably, spurred some to declare the death of the
PRM's normative contribution to contemporary debate. 43
The eBay decision is monumental. Did the Court properly reject the prop-
erty-patent equation in stripping patentees of a presumptive right to injunctive
relief? Are the patent and physical property laws sufficiently distinct as to war-
rant idiosyncratic rules? The answer lies in a fundamental discrepancy that un-
derlies the analogy between patents and physical property. This weakness lies in
the probabilistic nature of intellectual property rights, which display a level of
38. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Rich-
ardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), rev'd, 547
U.S. 388 (2006).
39. See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.l.
759, 768 (1999).
40. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The Patent Act grants an
inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or
importing the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). Similarly, the Court
had previously stressed the primacy of "the long-settled view that the essence of a
patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented inven-
tion." Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (198o).
41. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
42. See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Peti-
tioners, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
43. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of
the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759
(2006).
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indeterminism that may significantly undermine a literal invocation of tradi-
tional principles of real property law.44
From this perspective, one might imagine that eBay-far from constituting
a perpetual rejection of property rules in the IP field-merely revealed an oth-
erwise underappreciated fault in the property-patent equation. In contrast to
adherents to the property rights movement, 45 the Article finds eBay entirely
consistent with traditional jurisprudence governing real property. Although
there is a gross disparity in the level of uncertainty that characterizes intellectual
and tangible property, the latter body of law has in fact developed a rich set of
rules to cover instances of inadvertent infringement over property of nebulous
and ill-defined boundaries. Those promoting a closer union between the intel-
lectual and traditional property domains should, contrary to PRM advocates'
assertions, embrace eBay's suggestion that injunctive relief should be denied in
appropriate settings. 46
B. Defining the Right To Exclude
If one seeks to inform the construction of ideal intellectual property rules
by analogy to the law applied to traditional property, it is necessary to under-
stand the substance of the latter body of law. After all, PRM advocates urge the
adoption of traditional principles of exclusivity in the intellectual realm.
How is the right to exclude defined in the context of physical property? The
substance of that right was most famously articulated by William Blackstone as
"that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ-
ual in the universe." 47
Were the Blackstonian view an accurate depiction of traditional property
rights, an analogy between those rights and IP would result in the importation
of unqualified and dogmatic rights to exclude. Yet, circumstances unique to the
intellectual setting require that otherwise powerful rights to exclude be qualified
in appropriate circumstances. Ever-expanding and controversial patentable
subject matter, imperfect access to information, nebulous patent claims of inde-
terminate scope and validity (the focus of this Article), and the phenomenon of
ex post hold-up create an environment in which injunctive relief should be de-
44. This Article builds on a prior critique of the nebulous and uncertain nature of in-
tellectual property rights and the implications of that indeterminism for the for-
mulation of optimal legal rules. See Alan Devlin, The Stochastic Relationship Be-
tween Patents and Antitrust, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 75 (2009).
45. See Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., Court Soft on Property Rights, FIN. TIMES, May 16,
2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/6a9ade66-e4ef-iida-8ode-oooo779e234o.html.
46. One can certainly criticize the four traditional factors in equity that formed the
basis of the Court's test in eBay, even though, properly informed, these could be
employed to optimal end.
47. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *2.
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nied in certain situations. From this perspective, a property-patent equation in
the literal Blackstonian sense would be definitively undesirable in some settings.
The property rights movement has been accused of advocating just such a
nefarious position. Professor Menell, for instance, posited recently that PRM
advocates are attempting to "shoehorn intellectual property into an idealized
Blackstonian conception of property as exclusive and inviolate." 48 From this
perspective, an analogy from physical to intellectual property would allow pat-
entees to enjoin infringement in all scenarios. This presumably would include
situations that involve strategic ex post hold-out by patent trolls (nonpracticing
and nonlicensing patentees) and others.49 Such an extreme position may be
problematic.
The idea that traditional property rights invariably entail a rigid right to ex-
clude, however, is quite inaccurate. To the contrary, such rights are notable for
their malleability, given their demonstrable ability to facilitate efficient out-
comes in distinct circumstances by assuming a variety of forms.5 0 It would be
highly misleading to suggest that traditional property law accurately reflects the
Blackstonian conception of exclusivity. Indeed, as has been noted elsewhere,
Blackstone himself had anything but a Blackstonian view of property rights in
England at the time of his great work."
The law of tangible property shows great sensitivity to the circumstances of
different contexts-it is neither uniform nor dogmatic in its provision of in-
junctive relief. As demonstrated most authoritatively by Judge Richard Posner,
48. See Menell, supra note 25, at 37-38.
49. The author does not agree with some commentators' view that injunctions should
be denied where the patented technology is but a minor part of the infringer's ac-
tivity. The relevant criterion should involve both the accused infringer's notice of
the patent before initiating its investment and the patentee's willingness to market
or license its technology to third parties. For a representative case that placed un-
due weight on the centrality of the patented technology to the infringing product,
see z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2oo6)
("Here, product activation is a very small component of the Microsoft Windows
and Office software products that the jury found to infringe z4's patents. The in-
fringing product activation component of the software is in no way related to the
core functionality for which the software is purchased by consumers.").
5o. See Robert H. Cutting, "One Man's Ceilin' Is Another Man's Floor": Property Rights
as the Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819, 865 (2001); Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
51. See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76
IND. L.J. 803, 817 (2001) ("Blackstone's vision of ownership as the sole and des-
potic dominion of property no longer squares with a sensible account of private
property. But to his credit, Blackstone backed off this rhetorical flourish in giving
an early and elegant explanation of why it was necessary that the state have the
power of eminent domain to deal with the need to assemble the land needed for
highways."); David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103 (2009).
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property law has largely conformed to the principles of the Coase Theorem.52 It
creates a strong property rule in low-transaction cost environments where par-
ties are likely to contract privately so that the relevant right ends up being allo-
cated efficiently." In such settings, the law seeks to bestow the property right on
the party most likely to place the greatest utility on possessing it. Doing so eli-
minates the social cost of transacting and affects the relative wealth of the par-
ties in a presumably favorable way. Low-transaction cost settings usually exist
when the parties affected by the creation of a property right are both limited in
number and readily identifiable. 54
In circumstances where transaction costs are likely to exceed the social ben-
efit to parties of contracting to an efficient outcome, the initial allocation of a
property right becomes determinative . 5 The cost of error is high because if the
government mistakenly grants the right to the wrong party, private contracting
will not lead to an efficient outcome. In this setting-where the cost of con-
tracting is prohibitive-it generally is optimal to implement a liability rule. 6
Far from constituting a doctrinaire body of law that creates a determinative
property right in all contexts, traditional property law displays considerable
flexibility in application. This aspect of the law has led commentators to define
it largely as creating "a bundle of rights," rather than an unqualified right to ex-
clude in all circumstances. 57
There are many instances in which the law recognizes that property rules
and automatic injunctive relief are ill-suited to the traditional realm. For in-
stance, given disproportionate transaction costs relative to the value sought, the
law implies reciprocal easements between neighbors, thus permitting activity
that might otherwise be deemed nuisance. 8 Such neighbors need not bargain
for permission to engage in a conversation, or play music of moderate volume,
that can be heard from a bounding property. Similarly, water rights in the east-
ern United States are significantly communalized due to the ease with which
water can be accessed, in addition to its plentiful supply. 59 In that setting, ripar-
52. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31-87 (6th ed. 2003).
53. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 994-95 (2004).
54. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and
Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 95 (2004) ("Although there
is no definitive answer, the consensus view in law and economics is clear on at
least one issue: transaction costs should increase as the number of parties in the
negotiations increases.").
55. See POSNER, supra note 52, at 34, 61.
56. Id. at 67-71.
57. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Tran-
sition from Marx to Markets, III HARV. L. REV. 621, 662 (1998).
58. See Epstein, supra note 51, at 816.
59. See POSNER, supra note 52, at 35.
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ian owners can use water in any way that does not unduly interfere with others'
use of the same body of water.6" Contrast this situation to that of the dry West,
where consumption gives rise to a property right because water is more difficult
to obtain.61 Moreover, the power of eminent domain represents perhaps the
quintessential deviation from the Blackstonian conception of absolute exclusiv-
ity. Recognizing the problem of hold-out, and the many inefficiencies associ-
ated therewith, the law allows the government to seize private property upon
payment of market value.6" These examples demonstrate that "ownership" and
"exclusivity" possess distinct and malleable meanings, depending on the rele-
vant context. Property is indeed a softer and more flexible concept than would
be implied from Blackstone's classic articulation.
If the PRM advocate does not promote an absolute injunctive right in cases
of infringement, what does she hope to attain by analogy to the law of tangible
property? The answer lies not in an unqualified invocation of ideological prin-
ciples but rather in strong property rules in a context of surmountable transac-
tion costs. The fruit of this analogy gives meaning to the concept of a "right to
exclude." This subtlety is best expressed by one of the foremost defenders of the
PRM position, Professor Richard Epstein:
[AIll complex property systems, wherever located, require some mix of
absolute and common elements to maximize the value of the underly-
ing resources. Stated otherwise, [the] supposed absolutist position [of
the PRM] is anything but. One starts off with land (but not water) with
the presumption that the right to exclude, use, and dispose of property
is absolute. But in the next breath the law subjects that initial presump-
tion to scrutiny in order to find those situations where the reconfigura-
tion of rights.., will lead to overall social improvements, typically by
increasing in high transaction costs settings the value of property enti-
tlements through the forced transformation of property rights.6 3
So understood, the property-patent equation is more subtle than it first may
appear. Indeed, the point of the analogy may be thought of as a defense of the
primacy of property rules in situations facilitative of them. As in the physical
realm, property rights over information allow efficient Coasian contracting in
settings of sufficiently limited transaction costs. In the intellectual setting, there-
fore, one should start with the presumption that a right to injunctive relief is
appropriate. Other things being equal, from an ex ante perspective, only where
transaction costs are sufficiently pronounced should society revisit its presump-
tion of a property rule.6 4 Thus, it is not at all clear that a property-patent equa-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 55.
63. Epstein, supra note 4, at 6o.
64. The ex ante qualification ensures that parties are able to reach an efficient out-
come. In an ex post setting, lock-in may facilitate a patentee's artificial extraction
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tion warrants the introduction of unqualified rights to exclude in all settings
that involve patented technologies. Rather, optimal laws display sensitivity to
the merits of property vis-a-vis liability rules in each unique setting.
This approach gives meaning to the "right to exclude." Of course, the anal-
ogy is complicated by idiosyncrasies unique to the intellectual arena. As noted,
the increasing scope of patentable subject matter, the proliferation of patentees
who neither own nor license their proprietary technology, and the fact of ex
post hold-out combine to dilute the normative case for strong property rights
in the patent field. Yet these factors need not be determinative. They are not
systemic but, rather, context-specific issues that arise within the realm of patent
law. Most crucially, these traits are eminently observable by judges. If one con-
cludes that these traits are sufficiently severe to justify the denial of injunctive
relief, then courts should be able to deny such relief under the rubric of the
public interest.
Although the aforementioned concerns are self-contained, the dilemma of
uncertainty is not. This Article charts the stochastic nature of patent rights and
explains the normative repercussions of that indeterminism for the analogy to
traditional principles of property law. Unfortunately, the uncertain nature of
patents is systemic, applying in nearly all patent cases before judicial resolution
has been achieved. While concerns of patent trolls and ex post pecuniary extrac-
tion through strategic hold-out may implicate the relationship between physical
and intellectual property in certain cases, the fact of indeterminism applies in
nearly all. The following Part explores the implications of this uncertainty on
the ideal formulation of rights to exclude in the patent realm, in addition to fur-
ther rights derivative of that exclusivity.
II. PROBABILISTIC PATENTS: CONSEQUENTIAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLI-
CATIONS
A. Patent Rights, Indeterminism, and the Contrast with Physical Property
When one conceives of a "property right" and its associated ability to ex-
clude others, one tends to think in absolute terms. If a person owns a piece of
property, upon which a stranger decides to set up shop, the owner has a right to
eject the trespasser from his land by obtaining an injunction.6 5 While there may
be some uncertainty over the precise geographic reach of a particular person's
lot, one seldom encounters serious questions over the legitimacy of a plaintiffs
free- or leasehold interest in the land.
of monopoly rents beyond the value of its technology. Separately, this Article's fo-
cus on indeterministic patent rights involves consideration of whether the right to
exclude should be limited by that uncertainty, irrespective of transaction costs.
65. See Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 267, 313-14
(2002).
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The world of patent law is different. For those unfamiliar with the nature of
prosecution at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the reality of patent
litigation, the level of uncertainty underlying such intellectual property rights is
astonishing. The fact of "probabilistic patents" has significant repercussions for
one seeking to analogize the laws of physical and intellectual property. The right
to injunctive relief and contractual rights that are derivative of the exclusivity
inherent in a patent grant, in particular, are implicated.66 This Section proceeds
by exploring the extent, and explaining the cause, of issued patents' uncertainty.
I. The Stochastic Nature of Patent Rights
The stochastic nature of patents derives from two major sources of uncer-
tainty-probabilistic validity and indeterminate scope. The former emanates
from the PTO's failure to apply the requirements of patentability accurately
during the prosecution process.6 7 The latter results from the well-documented
limitations of language in explaining the nature of a claimed invention con-
cisely.68 Indeed, patent cases often involve pretrial proceedings, known as
Markman hearings, in which courts engage in claim construction to determine
what the relevant patents cover as a matter of law.6 9 Until this formal determi-
nation, patentees and potential infringers must engage in probabilistic assess-
ments of what conduct will be found to infringe a particular patent.
Patents are valid only if their award is consistent with the various technical
requirements of patentability laid down by the Patent Act.70 Yet, there is no
question that many patents are awarded in contravention of one or more provi-
sions of that Act. This shortcoming emanates from the PTO's inability to con-
duct a sufficient review of patentability. 7 Empirical evidence is at once instruc-
tive and disheartening. Historically, statistical studies indicated that patents
were invalidated in court at rates of 6o-70%.72 Although there has been some
66. See infra Section III.B.
67. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 6o STAN. L. REV. 45, 46-67 (2007).
68. See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 4, at 793-94; Katherine J. Strandburg, What
Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV.
81, 102.
69. The name arises from the case of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that claim construction is a matter
of law for a judge, and not a question of fact for the jury.
70. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2oo6).
71. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2004); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 67, at 46-67.
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limited improvement, contemporary studies are far from encouraging. Modern
estimates suggest that patents litigated to judgment will be invalidated in 42-
50% of cases.7
Given the central importance of patent indeterminacy to this Article, it is
worth specifying a number of the leading empirical studies on this matter. In
1998, Professors John Allison and Mark Lemley studied three hundred patent
cases and found that challenged patents were invalidated at a rate of 46%. 74 They
found this result to be similar to preceding empirical work. 75 Two years later,
Professor Kimberley Moore surveyed 1209 decisions in patent trials and deter-
mined that patentees lost 42% of the time. 6 Similarly, in 2004, Professors Jean
Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman found that "[w]in rates were close to 50%" in
the cases they analyzed from between 1978 and 1999 .77
Perhaps one should approach these results with some caution, given that
there may be an element of selection bias underlying the studies. It is an open
question whether the average quality of patents litigated to judgment is repre-
sentative of the larger pool of patents issued by the PTO. One would expect the
owners of strong patents to prevail prior to summary judgment, presumably
through some form of favorable settlement. Nevertheless, the foregoing empiri-
cal studies paint a depressing portrait of litigated patent quality, even if the spe-
cific findings exaggerate the poor quality of patents more generally.
Other indicia of quality also raise concern, however. The growth in success-
ful patent applications at the PTO has been twice as large as the growth experi-
72. See P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 233, 236 tbl.2
(1956); see also GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUB-
STANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-41 n.35.2 (rev. ed. 198o) (finding that courts upheld the va-
lidity of patents in only 35% of cases).
73. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Liti-
gated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (observing that nearly 50% of all liti-
gated patents are struck down); Donald R. Dunner, J. Michael Jakes & Jeffrey D.
Karceski, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5
FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intel-
lectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 59
(2004) (finding that win rates are close to 50% in patent cases); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, ii
SuP. CT. EcON. REV. 1, 37-38 (2004) (finding that patent owners succeed about
30% of the time at the Federal Circuit and suggesting that the availability of in-
junctive relief explains the departure from a 50% success rate); Kimberly A.
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box,
99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000) (taking a sample of cases over the period from
1983-99 and finding that patentees won 58% of the 1209 decisions in patent trials).
74. Allison & Lemley, supra note 73, at 205-o6.
75. Id. at 206.
76. Moore, supra note 73, at 385.
77. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 73, at 59.
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enced by the agency's international counterparts.78 This can be explained on the
ground that applicants view the PTO as more likely to grant an application that
would be rejected elsewhere.79 In addition, the agency itself has recognized al-
lowance error rates from 3 to 7%.8
Given the preceding evidence of the expected validity of patents issued by
the PTO, it follows that a patentee possesses what is, in effect, a highly probabil-
istic right to exclude.81 Indeed, patents have been referred to as "lottery tickets"
for just this reason.8"
Yet the fact of uncertainty emanates from more than validity alone. After
all, the holder of an unquestionably valid patent has exclusionary power only if
its claims are read in such a way as to capture a challenged practice. Until a
court engages in claim construction through a Markman hearing, however,
there may be a great deal of ambiguity concerning the meaning and scope of a
claimed invention." Patentees and potential infringers must therefore engage in
probabilistic determinations of what courts will likely conclude.8 4 With land,
there may be some uncertainty as to the precise metes and bounds of particular
lots. Patents may be thought of similarly, but the boundary of uncertainty is apt
to be far broader.
The problem derives from the limitations of language s5 The canons of con-
struction used to guide the interpretation of claims "are notoriously soft and
78. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 71, at 143.
79. Id. But see Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1563 (2006) (explaining this disparity on the ground of
differing national laws and the expense of obtaining international protection).
8o. See USPTO Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 3 (2005)
(statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and
Dir. of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/2oo5sepo8.pdf.
81. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 8.
82. Id. at 8o-83.
83. Indeed, even the courts struggle in making this determination. See, e.g., David L.
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Rever-
sal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2OO8).
84. For a good illustration of how unpredictable claim construction can be, see Ki-
netic Concepts v. Blue Sky Med. Group, 554 F.3d 101O, 1017-21 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(struggling with the meaning of something as ostensibly prosaic as "treating a
wound").
85. See, e.g., Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 165 (2oo8). To make matters worse, the judiciary re-
cently has displayed some reluctance to engage in the construction of explicitly
disputed claims. See IP Cleaning S.p.A. v. Annovi Reverberi, S.p.A., No. o8-CV-
147-BBC, 2008 WL 5119586 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 2008); Eppendorf AG v. Bio-Rad
Labs., Inc., No. 07-CV-623-BBC, 2008 WL 2788553 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 11, 2008).
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
often conflict." 6 The doctrine of equivalents, which enables a patentee to enjoin
activity that does not literally infringe its claims, complicates the analysis fur-
ther.s7 Worse still, the resulting uncertainty is compounded many times over by
the sheer number of patents that may exist in a given field. Although the short-
coming seemingly would be addressed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, which invalidates in-
definite patent claims, the standard used to inform that provision is edentulous.
Only those claims that are "insolubly ambiguous" are invalid.8 This, of course,
is a low standard and one that does little to remedy the problem of ambiguity in
patent claims.
For the company wishing to commercialize a product, the foregoing facts
pose an extraordinary challenge. If the company wishes to avoid infringing any-
one's patent, it first must survey the relevant field. This initial step may be inor-
dinately difficult. A single product in high-tech markets-semiconductors pro-
viding a prime example-may entail the use of literally thousands of patented
technologies8 9 Once all relevant patents have been identified (or, more realisti-
cally, once the company hopes all have been identified), they must be reviewed
to determine whether they claim some aspect of the proposed product. Yet, this
determination must be reached by examining a variety of written claims, many
crafted with deliberate ambivalence in the hope of enhancing the scope of the
claimed invention, and then determining whether those claims could be ex-
panded through the doctrine of equivalents to capture the proposed product.
Inevitably, definite conclusions will prove elusive. Certainty will only arise ex
post, following infringement proceedings in court, or conceivably following re-
examination if the company believes a potentially blocking patent is anticipated
or obvious given the prior art. The result has been aptly deemed a minefield by
some commentators.
90
This conclusion is far from academic. The difficulty of claim construc-
tion-and the uncertainty that emanates from it-can perhaps best be illus-
trated through empirical evidence. Representatively, Judge Kimberley Moore
86. Alan R. Madry, Legal Indeterminacy and the Bivalence of Legal Truth, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. 581, 588 (1999).
87. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.
1948).
88. See, e.g., Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 520 F.3d
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech.,
521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (employing § 112 to invalidate a claim).
89. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 4, at 797.
90. James R. Atwood, Securing and Enforcing Patents: The Role of Noerr/Pennington,
83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 651, 652 (2001); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gal-
lo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?-The
Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 70 n.38 (2006).
28:61 2009
INDETERMINISM AND THE PROPERTY-PATENT EQUATION
conducted a study which concluded that the Federal Circuit reversed 34.5% of
appealed claim constructions. 9'
When all these factors are combined, it becomes clear that patents bestow
highly stochastic exclusionary rights on their holders. A 2006 study by Professor
Paul Janicke and LiLan Ren focused on the success rate of patentees when fac-
tors beyond validity alone are considered. They discovered that once validity,
noninfringement, and enforceability all are considered, "accused patent infring-
ers have been winning patent infringement suits at a rate of three to one." 93
The reader perhaps should pause momentarily to reflect on the significance
of this statistic. A patent's value emanates from its legal ability to exclude others
from practicing the claimed invention. Yet Janicke and Ren discovered that
when a patentee attempts to exclude what it calculates (by some probabilistic
metric) to be infringing activity, its probability of success is, on average, a mere
25%.
Such profound legal uncertainty has a variety of implications for the proper
rules brought to bear on patentees. For policymakers seeking to inform their
construction of optimal IP laws, the law of traditional property may therefore
constitute an awkward reference point. Were a statistician to conduct an em-
pirical survey of real property owners' judicial success rates in obtaining relief in
cases of appropriation, trespass, or encroachment, one would expect to find a
wildly different outcome than in the intellectual property case. The fact of inde-
terminism therefore constitutes a point of marked departure between intellec-
tual and physical property.
Yet, the importance of these distinctions between real and intellectual
property can be exaggerated. The especially fragmented nature of patent owner-
ship, the primary importance of cumulative innovation, and the increased inci-
dence of ex post hold-up may be characteristic of the intellectual domain, but
they do not define it. They are issues that arise in some, not all, intellectual
property cases. More important still, such issues are not endemic to the world
of patents. Traditional property law has encountered similar difficulties-albeit
on a more modest scale-and has developed a rich body of doctrine from which
the intellectual property policymaker can borrow.
The extent of the indeterminism surrounding patents issued by the PTO,
however, throws tangible and intellectual property into potentially critical relief.
The fact of probabilistic patents conceivably could undermine the cause of the
property rights movement. One cannot make any unyielding a priori assump-
91. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Pre-
dictable?, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005); see also Christian A. Chu, Em-
pirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit overturned 29.6% of
appealed claim constructions).
92. See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA
Q.J. 1 (2006).
93. Id. at 3.
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tions about the expected validity of patent rights.94 Nevertheless, the existence
of uncertainty does not undermine fatally the property-patent equation. 95 Al-
though the level of indeterminism is far more modest in the traditional realm,
the law of realty does offer some helpful guidance in how it deals with cases of
innocent encroachment on property with ill-defined borders. 6
2. The Source of Patents' Uncertain Quality
Before exploring the implications of patent uncertainty on the right to ex-
clude, it is important to explain the source of that indeterminism. As the
asymmetric certainty that characterizes tangible and intellectual property has
significant repercussions for the property-patent equation, it is helpful to ex-
plore how that analogy may benefit from enhanced certainty in the patent field.
In order to create more secure rights, however, a policymaker first must com-
prehend the source of the current weakness in patent prosecution.
The PTO's difficulties arise most obviously from the combination of an ev-
er-increasing volume of applications and inadequate funding. The number of
applications filed with the PTO has increased from 164,558 in 1990 to 295,926 in
2000, 390,733 in 2005, and over 450,000 in 2007.9 7 Such a vast and growing vol-
ume of applications has created an enormous backlog. 9' Representatively, in
2007, the PTO received 456,154 applications but issued only 182,930 patents.99
The results are predictable. As of 2008, there were more than 1.2 million patent
applications pending at the PTO.' ° ° The difficulty is exacerbated further by the
increasing complexity of many applications, particularly in the relatively new
94. In contrast, one can make sound a priori assumptions about situations where a
nonlicensing and nonpracticing patentee seeks to enjoin a productive enterprise.
Such facts are largely self-evident from a cursory look at the case itself. In contrast,
the validity and scope of a given patent right must await judicial determination.
95. See infra Section II.B.
96. See id.
97. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Table of Annual U.S. Patent Activity Since
1790 (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/h-countspdf.
98. See The Cost of Ideas, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2004, at 71 (noting with great concern
that "[l]ast year, the PTO received around 350,000 [patent) applications and cur-
rently has a backlog of over halfa million to review").
99. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 97; U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, Patenting Trends: Calendar Year 2007 (Feb. 21, 2008),
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/patjtro7.htm.
ioo. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 117 tbl.3 (20o8), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
about/stratplan/ar/20o8/2o8annualreport.pdf.
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fields of patentable subject matter (software, business methods, biotechnology,
and nanotechnology).' O'
In addition to these particularized problems, a number of systemic short-
comings undermine the PTO's ability to conduct as reliable and scrutinizing a
review as the courts. Most obviously, the ex parte nature of prosecution limits
the amount of information available to the relevant examiner." 2 Competitors in
the applicant's market may possess critical information, yet they are prohibited
from contributing to the process in any way. 3 Additionally, it stands to reason
that the applicant often will have a greater familiarity with the prior art than the
appointed examiner, yet the prospective patentee is under no duty to search
that art prior to submitting an application.0 4 An applicant need only disclose
prior art of which she is aware.0 5 A considerable information asymmetry be-
tween the examiner and applicant results, which compromises the quality of the
prosecution process." 6
Beyond these factors, there are some negative incentives that may impact
the performance of examiners. Some have argued in particular that the practice
of continuations has been abused by some prospective patentees to pressure ex-
aminers into approving an unworthy application.' Because of this practice, an
examiner cannot make a determined applicant go away. An examiner can issue
what is misleadingly known as a "final rejection," but the disappointed yet per-
sistent applicant can start the process all over again by paying an additional fil-
ing fee.0 s Given that this process can be repeated ad nauseum, it is possible that
some applicants will eventually wear down an initially recalcitrant examiner or
l1. See id. at 18; National Association of Patent Practitioners, Comments on the
Changes To Implement the Patent Business Goals,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/rules/comments/
adv business-goals/ao8.jsp.
102. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 67, at 54-55.
103. This rule likely is a necessary evil. IP policy suggests that an inventor whose appli-
cation is rejected should be able to resort to trade secret protection. Excluding ri-
vals from the prosecution process is necessary to accomplish this goal.
104. See Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("[A]s a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a prior art search, and thus there
is no duty to disclose art of which an applicant could have been aware." (quoting
FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
1o5. See Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century:
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147 (2005).
1o6. See Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct To Improve Patent Quality: Clean-
sing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 148 (2006).
107. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,
84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004).
1o8. Id. at 68.
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perhaps be appointed a new examiner.!°9 It also has been suggested that cultural
norms at the PTO predispose the prosecution process toward the liberal grant-
ing of patents. ' In addition, some posit that there may be some pecuniary in-
centive for an examiner to grant an application.' A final problem, hardly lim-
ited to the PTO setting, involves the allure of the private sector. Given the
higher salaries available outside the PTO, the agency struggles to maintain its
top examiners.' 2
In short, information asymmetry between the examiner and applicant,"3
the non-adversarial nature of the proceeding,"4 pecuniary incentives for exam-
iners to grant applications,"5 the placement of the burden of persuasion for the
patentability determination on the examiner rather than the applicant,"6 and
the practice of continuations'1 7 combine to cause the unsatisfactory perform-
ance witnessed at present.
B. The Implications of Uncertainty on the Right To Exclude
The property-patent equation is complicated by a number of factors that
are likely to be unusually pronounced in the setting of intellectual property.
Fragmentation, overlapping rights, the sheer volume of patents covering some
fields, and the phenomenon of nonpracticing, nonlicensing patent trolls seeking
to hold up commercialized technologies complicate an analogy between the law
of traditional property and that of intellectual property. A more nuanced view
of this relationship, however, reveals that these phenomena do not constitute a
point of collective departure from the traditional setting. While a limited appeal
lo9. A recent important decision of the Federal Circuit has reduced this danger. In
McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 487 F. 3d 897 (Fed. Cir.
2007), the court held that an applicant's failure to disclose that its previous at-
tempt had been rejected by a former examiner amounted to misuse.
iio. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.
L. Sci. & TECH. 1 (2007).
in. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Pro-
posalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305,324.
112. 147 Cong. Reg. 21,673 (2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("The PTO cannot hire
or retain qualified patent examiners with advanced scientific degrees; they prefer
the more lucrative salaries in the private sector.").
113. See Mack, supra note 1o6, at 148.
114. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 67, at 54.
115. See Thomas, supra note in, at 324.
116. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effect of Unenforced Invalid Patents,
91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 108 (2006).
117. See, e.g., Lemley & Moore, supra note 107 (discussing the problem of continua-
tions, which allow disappointed applicants to continuously refile their patent ap-
plications and prevent examiners from permanently rejecting them).
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to the stark case of large-scale trespass on another's land would dictate an overly
literal right to exclude in the intellectual domain, the law of realty bears witness
to a far vaster scope of unique contexts-and unique solutions-than may ap-
pear at first. By imposing liability rule solutions in high-transaction cost and
other appropriate environments, traditional property law displays sensitivity to
the vicissitudes of circumstance. When one construes the law of realty from this
perspective, the property-patent equation involves a highly nuanced inquiry.
But what of the probabilism underlying a patentee's right to exclude? How
should this impact a court's decision to deny or grant an injunction? Can the
law of real property aid in answering these questions? Given the uncertainty
underlying all patent grants ex ante, the implication for equitable relief clearly is
significant. Putting aside issues of patent trolling, sequential investment, and
strategic hold-out-all of which are eminently identifiable by a court on a case-
specific basis-concern over the validity of a patent may in itself constitute a
worthy ground for adopting a liability rule.
Cracks in the foundation of a person's property right clearly implicate his
ability to enforce that right in a manner of his choosing. As applied to the re-
quest for injunctive relief, the contrast between intellectual and tangible prop-
erty becomes all the more paramount. Society suffers an unambiguous social
loss when a court grants an injunction to a patentee erroneously. This is be-
cause the unwarranted exclusivity enjoyed by the prevailing patentee denies
countless consumers access to the technology. With real property, no matter
how the court decides, only one owner will possess the property. Conceivably,
even if the court grants the property right to the wrong person, the outcome
still may be efficient if the victor places higher utility on the resource than the
competing claimant. We can, however, unequivocally conclude that an errone-
ous determination of patent validity is a social welfare-reducing outcome.
As a result, improvidently granted patents should be invalidated. With re-
spect to the right to exclude, one must recall that the injunction is the primary
mechanism that the holder of a mistakenly awarded patent can use to create so-
cial welfare losses. Before a court grants injunctive relief, one would expect the
questions of validity and scope to be resolved determinatively. More specifi-
cally, should not the holder of a probabilistic patent necessarily possess a weaker
right to exclude another than one who possesses a definite right?
The Supreme Court seems to think so. In the eBay decision, the Court held
that patentees do not enjoy a presumptive right to injunctive relief upon a
showing of infringement.11 Although the Court's decision was rather cursory,
there is some ground for believing that patent indeterminism played at least
some role in its decision. In particular, Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, in concurrence and writing with an eye toward controversial business
method patents, noted the importance of the "potential vagueness and suspect
validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under [the Court's
enunciated] test."119
118. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (20o6).
119. Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Was this decision correct? One might be tempted to criticize immediately
the Court's judgment on the basis that any uncertainty underlying the relevant
property right has been resolved by the time judicial relief is forthcoming. After
all, by then, any claims of patent invalidity or non-infringement have been re-
solved in favor of the patentee. From this perspective, the preceding discussion
of weak patents and poor prosecution at the PTO would seem decidedly aca-
demic. If it turns out that an inventor was awarded a patent correctly, then the
right to exclude inherent in that grant should be respected-irrespective of the
expected validity of other intellectual property rights.
This position has some intuitive force. Society hardly gains by diluting the
exclusivity of unquestionably legitimate property rights, at least insofar as the
other factors potentially warranting a liability solution are absent.' Strong
rights to exclude ensure that the deserving inventor reaps sufficient pecuniary
reward to justify her ex ante investment and risk. The alternative leads inexora-
bly to patentee undercompensation."' Consistent with these considerations, un-
til 20o6, U.S. law provided that as a general rule "a permanent injunction
[would] issue once infringement and validity ha[d] been adjudged. 1 2 This ap-
pears consistent with a focus on the legitimacy of intellectual property.
Nevertheless, the fact of ex post validity may be misleading and could result
in the issuance of a greater number of injunctions than is socially desirable. In
this regard, it is important to recognize the threshold distinction between un-
certainty on the basis of prediction and postdiction.1 3 The former is worthy of
our exclusive attention in formulating optimal legal policy. The latter incorpo-
rates a danger of hindsight bias that may move us to adopt inefficient rules in
an ex post setting. Given the necessarily limited information available ex ante,
policymakers are forced to make decisions and formulate rules based on prob-
abilistic assessments of the future. A decision can be rational (and therefore
"correct") even if it turns out after the fact to have been the wrong one. A gam-
bler with a ninety-nine percent chance of winning is rational in his decision to
play his hand, even if he is unfortunate enough to lose. As applied to the world
of IP, the fact that a court ultimately finds a patent valid does not mean a pre-
sumption of such validity is warranted ex ante. A judicial determination that
infringement of a valid patent has taken place does not necessarily counsel an
award of injunctive relief. In certain circumstances, the ex ante prospect of a
certain patent being found both valid and infringed may be highly attenuated. A
liability rule occasionally be may desirable in such situations.
120. Such distinct grounds include, in particular, incidences of patent trolling. See, e.g.,
John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007).
121. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 2093.
122. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
123. For an excellent discussion on this matter more generally, see Ehud Guttel & Alon
Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal Postdiction, 107 MICH. L.
REv. 467 (2008).
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One focusing on the issue of uncertainty in property rights conceivably
could argue that eBay was a profoundly poor decision, given the facts there at
issue. Where, as there, a plaintiff's patent has been proven infringed and not
found invalid, one might posit that an injunction generally should follow. This
position could be supported on the ground that any indeterminism underlying
the scope and validity of the relevant patent has been resolved by the time final
judicial relief is forthcoming. Such a perspective, of course, would mistake the
ex ante and ex post states of the world, with serious repercussions for policy.
The indeterminism that society should be concerned with is that which existed
before a court's resolution of the issues. Depending on the level of uncertainty
ex ante, liability rules may in fact prove superior.
Thus, for the purpose of constructing optimal rules, one need be concerned
with ex ante incentives only. Here, the property-patent equation is most help-
ful. Although patents are far more suspect in terms of expected validity, the law
of traditional property unquestionably can aid us. Consider the case of inadver-
tent trespass onto land of ill-defined contours. More specifically, envision a sit-
uation in which a person constructs a building or structure on his land that ex-
tends in some way onto the land of a neighbor. Such encroachment obviously
implicates the neighbor's exclusion rights. From a Blackstonian perspective, the
neighbor's right to an injunction would be unqualified, allowing her to enjoy
her property "in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni-
verse." 24 In short, one might expect a property rule to protect the innocent
landowner from such instances of encroachment.
Consistent with the literal Blackstonian view, the general rule is that a
mandatory injunction is the appropriate remedy for a person whose land has
been encroached upon by an adjoining neighbor.125 Similarly, cases of repeated
or continuing trespass on real property give rise to a right to relief by injunc-
tion.6 Perhaps surprisingly, however, this Blackstonian approach is far from
unqualified. In many cases, particularly those entailing land of nebulous boun-
daries, courts have jettisoned injunctive relief in favor of a liability rule.
The fact of innocent trespass is central to the law's analysis of such situa-
tions. Inadvertence is intimately related to the clarity of a neighbor's borders. A
person who knowingly constructs a building or structure that extends onto an-
other's land does so at his own risk, for he has no rights against the encroached
neighbor.'2 7 Black letter law provides that an injunction shall issue against such
124. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *2.
125. See, e.g., Bonde v. Bishop, 245 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Shattles v. Field,
Brackett & Pitts, Inc., 261 So. 2d 795, 797-98 (Miss. 1972); Santilli v. Morelli, 230
A.2d 86o, 863 (R.I. 1967).
126. See, e.g., Brackin v. Porter, 120 So. 2d 693, 695 (Ala. 196o); Bartholomew v. Staheli,
195 P.2d 824, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
127. This principle has long been established. See, e.g., Morgan v. Veach, 139 P.2d 976,
98o-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943); Johnson v. Killian, 27 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1946); Pra-
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intentional encroachment, irrespective of the balance of convenience-even if
the landowner suffers de minimis harm and the trespasser will suffer consider-
able cost in removing the offending structure.2 s
In contrast, where a neighbor unknowingly encroaches on another's prop-
erty, the court may decline to grant an injunction where the border of the rele-
vant property was ill-defined, the ensuing trespass was inadvertent, the harm to
the landowner is limited, and the cost to the encroacher from having to tear
down its sunk investment is greatly disproportionate to the landowner's
harm.12 9 The innocence of the trespasser is a sine qua non for the denial of in-
junctive relief.3' Such innocence invariably turns on whether the borders of the
encroached property were apparent or reasonably discoverable upon inspec-
tion. Although such uncertainty goes to the scope of the landowner's right (akin
to claim construction in the patent context), the effect on ex ante incentives is
delt v. Lewis, 13o N.E. 785, 787 (Ill. 1921); Van De Carr v. Schloss, lOl N.Y.S.2d 48,
51-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
128. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951) (holding with
regard to a deliberate encroachment of another's land that "equity may well re-
quire its restoration regardless of the expense of removal as compared with dam-
age suffered therefrom"); Tyler v. Haverhill, 172 N.E. 342, 343 (Mass. 1930)
("[O]ne who knows of claims to land which he proposes to use as his own, pro-
ceeds at his peril if he goes forward in the face of protests from the claimant and
places structures upon the land."); Tucker v. Howard, 128 Mass. 361, 363 (1880)
(finding that a person who built a wall encroaching on a neighbor's land did so at
his peril, given that he had been served with process and notice of the neighbor's
property rights).
129. See, e.g., Nixon v. Harper, 8 Conn. Supp. 8, lo (Conn. Super. Ct. 1940) ("A man-
datory injunction to remove the offending structure should not issue. 'Where ....
there has been an innocent mistake.., or where the conduct of the defendant was
not willful and inexcusable, and where the granting of the injunction would cause
damage to the defendant greatly disproportionate to the injury of which plaintiff
complains and it appear that damages will adequately compensate the latter .... it
would be inequitable to grant a mandatory injunction."' (citation omitted) (first
and third alterations in original)).
130. See, e.g., D'Andrea v. Pringle, 52 Cal. Rptr. 606, 61o (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Capodi-
lupo v. Vozzella, 704 N.E.2d 534, 535 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that a land-
owner is generally entitled to injunctive relief, even if the encroachment was unin-
tentional or negligent and the cost of removal is comparatively substantial, but
that removal will not be ordered where the encroachment was made innocently
and the cost of removal would be greatly disproportionate); Lynch v. Union Inst.
for Say., 34 N.E. 364, 365 (Mass. 1893) (denying injunctive relief where, by an in-
nocent mistake, structures had been erected slightly upon the plaintiffs land and
where the damage that would be caused by removal to the defendant would be
greatly disproportionate); Owenson v. Bradley, 197 N.W. 885, 888 (N.D. 1924);
Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1120 (Utah 2001). But see Marcus v. Brody, 149
N.E. 673, 674 (Mass. 1925) (granting an injunction notwithstanding the fact of in-
nocent trespass).
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similar to what might be the case if the landowner's ownership of the land itself
were questioned (similar to the question of patent validity). In both cases, the
breadth and force of the owner's right to exclude are implicated.
Long-established principles of land law therefore deny injunctive relief in
certain cases of innocent encroachment over land of nebulous definition. The
analogy to the world of patents could not be plainer. As Judge Easterbrook has
noted, there is no difference in principle between a patentee's and a landowner's
right to exclude: "Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does
with real property."' 3 A neighbor constructing on what he reasonably believes
to be his land may operate in a somewhat indeterminate environment ex ante,
but all uncertainty disappears once the matter is resolved in court. Yet, notwith-
standing the unquestionable presence of a valid property right held by the
wronged neighbor, the law declines to adopt a property rule. As a result, some
landowners are denied the right to exclude that would initially seem to define
the substance of their legal ownership. The situation is no different in cases of
patent infringement where patentees seek to enjoin infringing activity. A com-
mercializing entity may survey the prior art and conclude-based on its subjec-
tive construction of the patent claims it has uncovered-that its planned activi-
ties will not implicate any proprietary technologies. Its action in "encroaching"
on another's patented technology may be every bit as innocent as a neighbor's
accidental construction on the border of another's property, if not more so. In
addition, uncertain legality turns on more than scope. Even if a property right
over a given technology is brought to its attention, it may determine based on
its knowledge of the prior art that the relevant claim is invalid as obvious or an-
ticipated. Indeed, the level of indeterminism underlying an asserted patent
claim is apt to be more severe than would be associated with innocent en-
croachment in the physical realm.
The preceding analogy implies a number of conclusions. As a general mat-
ter, the property-patent equation suggests that injunctive relief may be properly
denied in the intellectual setting on the ground of uncertainty. Further insights
help identify the specific traits of cases in which monetary damages should be
awarded in lieu of equitable relief.
First, a liability rule should be implemented if the patentee was aware of the
infringing use but did not seek to apprise the infringer of its patent rights until
significant, sunk investment had taken place. This is equivalent to the law's de-
nial of an injunction where a landowner declines to apprise her encroaching
neighbor of the boundary of her property, which creates an estoppel.'32 Of
course, this conclusion would not apply if the infringing party either knew of
the patent or maintained willful ignorance of the state of the art in the field.'33
131. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 1O9.
132. This refers to the common law doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence. See, e.g., Da-
vidson v. Van Lengen, 266 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Iowa 1978).
133. Unfortunately, this analysis is complicated by some idiosyncrasies of the patent
field. Of particular note is the phenomenon in which myriad inventors maintain
deliberate ignorance of the prior art to stave off future claims of willful infringe-
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Second, a court should be hesitant to grant an injunction where an in-
fringement defendant scoured the prior art for blocking patents, failed to un-
cover one, and successfully commercialized a product. A predicate condition
underlying this conclusion would be that the patentee charging infringement
not market or license its technology. Such activity would amount to notice as a
matter of law. One might analogize such marketing or licensing to a land-
owner's use of his property up to the boundary point. One hardly could claim
innocence when encroaching onto another's land that is being visibly cultivated
or employed for some other self-evident purpose.
3 4
The nature of infringement is a further prerequisite to denying an injunc-
tion on this ground. Where the infringed patent constitutes but a small part of
the relevant product, the case for damages is surely stronger (though not a
ground for denying equitable relief in itself). This might be thought of as tan-
tamount to trespassing onto land through construction. Before courts deny in-
junctions in such cases, they require that there be a considerable asymmetry be-
tween the harm caused to the property owner from encroachment and the sunk
cost suffered by the involuntary encroacher who would have to tear down his
construction. The harm to the patentee in cases of marginal infringement is
ment that could expose them to treble damages. Fortunately, a recent decision of
the Federal Circuit, which significantly increased the standard for a showing of
willful infringement, bears the potential to alleviate this problem. In re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 136o (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). Regardless, though, intellec-
tual property law should treat a deliberately ignorant infringer the same way tra-
ditional property law treats a neighbor who negligently commences construction
with indifference to the precise boundary of another's land. In both cases, with
other things being equal, injunctive relief should be forthcoming. In addition to
promoting the efficiencies of a property regime-namely, by incentivizing a po-
tential infringer to negotiate for permission with the property holder ex ante, ra-
ther than going through the indeterminate expense of ex post litigation over dam-
ages-this approach would further counter the perverse tendency for inventors to
ignore the prior art.
134. While it is true that another's use of one's land may be more readily apparent to
one's neighbor than a company's licensing or commercialization of its patented
technology is to its competitors, there are overriding public policy reasons to find
constructive notice in both cases. A company that is employing its patented tech-
nology to commercial end must be allowed the full right to exclude any infringing
practice of the relevant invention. Only by granting a property right can society
ensure that entities invent and commercialize easily appropriated technologies.
The case for a liability rule is most compelling where the patentee is neither em-
ploying nor licensing its intellectual property right but is sitting on it in the hope
of ambushing an unsuspecting company that actually sells goods to the public. By
analogy to the world of land law, one could characterize such a patent troll as be-
ing similar to the landowner who remains silent as his neighbor innocently en-
croaches onto his land.
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limited.'35 If a patentee is neither commercializing nor licensing her invention, it
is difficult to argue that she is suffering substantial harm from another's inad-
vertent use of that knowledge. Such is the nature of non-exclusivity in con-
sumption of information.' 36 In stark contrast, the harm to a company that has
succeeded in marketing a valuable product from having to shut down its opera-
tion would be vastly disproportionate to the patentee's harm. Such factual cir-
cumstances map perfectly the courts' denial of injunctive relief in cases of mis-
taken encroachment. Unfortunately, actual examples of such cases abound,
which makes the availability of a liability rule in such cases critical. '37
In sum, the patentee who brings suit in any of the foregoing circumstances
should be denied injunctive relief in much the same setting as a landowner
whose property is encroached upon by a neighbor's construction.
A more difficult case would involve a company that, having surveyed the
field, discovers a potentially blocking patent but concludes on the basis of ex-
pert advice that its proposed commercialization would not amount to in-
fringement of the claims. Alternatively, the company might receive advice that
the potentially infringed claim was likely invalid, for example on the basis of the
prior art. Under current principles of patent law, such facts would be determi-
native in defeating a claim of willful infringement but would play no role in
convincing a court to adopt a liability, in place of property, rule.' 3s In the patent
setting, liability rules are employed, or equivalently injunctive relief is denied,
where the four factors in equity favor that result.'39 One could entertain an
analogy to the physical setting, where a person might seek professional advice
135. "Marginal infringement" may be defined for the present purposes as infringe-
ment, even if unquestioned, of a patent that provides only a marginal addition to
the commercialized product for which an injunction has been sought.
136. There is another close connection here to the case of physical encroachment: If
the owner is actually using the land (whether for cultivation or other activities),
trespass onto it interferes with his enjoyment of his property.
137. The seemingly paradigmatic example is NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418
F.3d 1282, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005), where the district judge, upon a finding of willful
infringement, issued an injunction ordering the defendant to cease and desist in-
fringing the patents. This would have had the effect of shutting down the entire
BlackBerry network in the United States; public outrage ensued. Nevertheless, Re-
search in Motion does not serve as an example of a case where a liability rule
should have been implemented. Given that the infringement was willful, the exis-
tence of ex post social harm masks the fact that employing a property rule incen-
tivizes potential infringers in the future to negotiate licenses ex ante. Research in
Motion learned a painful lesson. In March 2006, it settled the case for $612.5 mil-
lion.
138. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d at 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (" [T]o es-
tablish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent.").
139. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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concerning the metes and bounds of his neighbor's property and then erect a
structure within what he believes erroneously to be his land. In such a scenario,
one might imagine that a court would place weight on the pursuit of profes-
sional advice in weighing whether to award an injunction or not.
Yet, for a variety of reasons, courts should not always deny equitable relief
on the basis of a patent's uncertainty alone. Granting damages in all such cases
would fail to incentivize desirable behavior. If a company encounters a blocking
patent that may be invalid, a property rule would encourage the company either
to avail of the PTO's reexamination process or to obtain a license and then seek
a declaratory judgment of invalidity.' 4° Still, a court should look favorably on an
infringer's efforts to avoid infringement. This, in conjunction with other perti-
nent facts of the kind discussed above, should weigh on the decision of whether
to grant an injunction. 4'
Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in eBay-far from constituting an ines-
capable and direct affront to the property rights movement-may reflect proper
principles of traditional property law. Nevertheless, the decision can be criti-
cized for the vagueness of the test enunciated by the Court, which would allow
injunctive relief where the patentee has suffered irreparable injury, monetary
damages are inadequate to compensate for the injury, the balance of hardships
favors an injunction, and the public interest would not be disserved by the rem-
edy.142 This, of course, is the traditional four-factor test applied by courts in eq-
uity, but it does not specify the appropriate approach in a patent case. The
Court specifically rejected the contention that the fact that a patentee is neither
practicing nor licensing the patented technology itself satisfies the test.143 So,
how should courts apply this test in practice? The Court gave little guidance. 44
140. Until recently, the ability of a patent licensee to bring suit for a declaratory judg-
ment was limited. In 2007, under pressure from a decision of the Supreme Court
in a related context, the Federal Circuit held that the offer of a patent license gives
the recipient standing to bring an action for declaratory judgment. See Sandisk
Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
141. It must be emphasized that damages should not always be awarded in lieu of equi-
table relief. Indeed, courts should generally be predisposed toward granting in-
junctive relief in cases of proven infringement of a valid patent. One situation
where a property rule should unquestionably be employed would involve patents
that have been previously upheld as valid, whether through litigation or reexami-
nation. The scrutiny brought to bear on patents under these circumstances not
only goes a long way toward resolving their validity and scope but could be ex-
pected to grant industry participants notice of the intellectual property rights.
142. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
143. Id.
144. See The Supreme Court: 2oo5 Term-Leading Cases, 12o HARV. L. REV. 125, 337
(2006) (explaining that "eBay raises more questions about the grant of permanent
injunctions than it answers").
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Appeal to the property-patent equation can aid one seeking to apply the
four-factor test in the setting of intellectual property. The locus of the relevant
inquiry surely will be in the public interest prong of the standard. The first two
elements of the test-irreparable injury and inadequacy of remedy at law-are
essentially identical. In the patent setting, the balance of hardships may some-
times be subsumed within the public interest prong. This is because patent pol-
icy is a tool developed to promote social welfare. If the balance of hardships is
strongly against granting a patentee an injunction-presumably because a non-
practicing and non-licensing plaintiff is seeking to hold up a product innocently
commercialized by a defendant-it is likely that granting an injunction in favor
of the plaintiff would disserve the public interest.
The preceding discussion has explained how traditional principles of land
law can aid courts in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief with respect to
a probabilistic property right. In particular, such relief should be denied: (1)
where a patentee failed to apprise an infringer of its property right (thus facili-
tating the defendant's inadvertent infringement in an environment of limited
information and high uncertainty), or (2) where a defendant engaged in an ac-
tive search of the prior art, failed to identify the pertinent patent that covers but
a small portion if the infringing product, and the patentee neither licenses nor
markets its technology. As noted, the fact that an infringer identified a poten-
tially blocking patent but received expert advice to the effect that the patent was
either invalid or would not be infringed should not determine whether or not
an injunction should be denied but should be weighed in the relevant calculus.
A final word is due with regard to preliminary injunctions. In this setting,
the fact of indeterminism is of central and inescapable importance. A precondi-
tion to awarding injunctive relief is that the movant establish a strong probabil-
ity of success on the merits.1 45 Yet, in the patent setting, determinative resolu-
tion of questions of validity must generally await the close of discovery. Given
the systemic uncertainty underlying patent rights, one would expect that pre-
liminary injunctive relief would be treated as inappropriate in all but the clear-
est infringement disputes. Fortunately, the law is attuned to this danger and will
entertain such a request only where a patentee "clearly shows" that his patent is
valid and infringed.146 To do so, a plaintiff must rely on more than force of
words. A patentee will be able to satisfy the standard only by either pointing to a
prior adjudication of validity in a suit taken by it against another party147 or
providing evidence of industry-wide acquiescence in the face of a patent' 4 This
tenet of the law is eminently desirable.
145. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1562
(S.D. Cal. 1996).
146. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals, 773 F.2d 1230, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
147. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
148. For a classic explanation of this position, see Blount v. Societe Anonyme du Filtre
Chamberland Systeme Pastuer, 53 F. 98, 102-03 (6th Cir. 1892). See also Eli Lilly &
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C. Stochasticism and Implications for the "Zone of Exclusion"
The law of traditional property helps inform the right to exclude that para-
digmatically defines every patent grant. As explored, even though the level of
uncertainty associated with these intellectual property rights is far greater than
that associated with real property rights, traditional land law has a wealth of
doctrine with which to inform the construction of patent rules. Far from im-
porting dogmatic rights to injunctive relief, a nuanced and proper appeal to the
law of tangible property is most helpful. Ultimately, the fact of indeterminism
does not undermine the legitimacy of the property-patent equation.
Nevertheless, the existence of aoristic patent rights does have another, far
more significant, effect on the viability of that equation. Quite apart from the
question of whether to apply a property or liability rule in incidences of patent
infringement is the issue of how to regulate potentially nefarious conduct that is
justified on the basis of the underlying patent's exclusive force. As explored ini-
tially by the author elsewhere, an unconstrained patentee may take steps artifi-
cially to enhance the exclusive force of its highly probabilistic right. 14 9 Doing so
would allow it to reap the pecuniary rewards of more secure property.
To achieve this end, a patentee may do one of two things. First, it may as-
sign its proprietary technology to a third party. This would cause the assignee to
assume the full risk of invalidity. 5 ° The efficacy of this approach, however, is
limited by the fact that the assignee will require a premium, and thus discount
the contract price, to compensate it for taking on that risk. In addition, infor-
mation asymmetry or indeterminate future commercial worth may deny a pat-
entee a purchase price that would be justified ex post. Ultimately, such an ar-
rangement will only prove attractive to a patentee if the assignee has a greater
appetite for risk or if the patentee needs to realize an approximation of the
long-run value immediately.
The second, likely more effective, possibility is for a patentee to internalize
the risk of invalidity but contract with those most likely to challenge the legiti-
macy of its intellectual property. The precise arrangement could take numerous
forms, from reciprocal assurances not to sue to creating a joint venture, but the
quintessential example is provided by the phenomenon of reverse exclusionary
agreements in the pharmaceutical industry. 1"
Thus, a patentee who wishes to enhance the expected validity (and hence
pecuniary return) of its intellectual property has numerous avenues open to
Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1o96 (5th Cir. 1972); Julien v. Gomez &
Andre Tractor Repairs, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 763,765 (M.D. La. 1977).
149. See Devlin, supra note 44.
150. Alternatively, though less effectively, a patentee could license its IP rights to a
third party with contractual conditions that require the licensee to continue pay-
ing royalties even if the relevant patent is found invalid.
151. See Hemphill, supra note 2.
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him. In all events, the various constituent elements of patents' uncertainty are
implicated by rival action. A patent's value comes from its ability to exclude
others from practicing a valuable invention. The enforcement of one's intellec-
tual property rights necessarily comes at the cost of competitors. Thus, rivals
who conclude that an enforced patent right is vulnerable to invalidation or a
possible finding of noninfringement have every incentive to challenge that intel-
lectual property, whether in court or in front of the PTO via reexamination.
This process is immensely valuable given the highly imperfect level of re-
view given to applications throughout prosecution. 5 One must recall that the
patent laws are "an exception to the general rule against monopolies"'153 and are
justified on the ground of a quid pro quo. Society suffers the loss of free con-
sumption of valuable public goods in order to induce innovators to make future
generations of such goods available. Where a patent is granted mistakenly by
the PTO, consumers are improperly denied free access to valuable information
that belongs in the public domain. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court
has emphasized the pressing need to facilitate the challenge of potentially inva-
lid patents.5 4
This policy perspective is crucial because a profit-maximizing patentee will
rationally seek to contract with rivals to forego such challenge. Given free rein,
such entities will be able to secure their intellectual property. Of course, such
contractual arrangements will bear a cost for the relevant patentees, as there
necessarily will be a wealth transfer to horizontal competitors. But the arrange-
ments will not yield distributional or allocative gains in favor of society and
consumers. Strong policy grounds therefore suggest limits on patentees' free-
dom of contract.
How does the property-patent equation apply to this issue? As is true of
other policy challenges involving intellectual property, appeal to long-
established principles of traditional property law may be tempting. But, unlike
the case of exclusivity in the face of infringement, a close analogy here between
real and intellectual property law may be highly misleading.
One tempted to draw a prescriptive parallel in this setting might conclude
that a property owner has an absolute right to pay a person who threatens to
commit trespass to refrain from such conduct. In the case of land, an owner's
152. Indeed, Professor Lemley has opined that such rival-induced, post-grant litigation
is eminently desirable. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1510-11 (2001). Professor Lemley draws this conclusion be-
cause the vast majority of patents scrutinized by the PTO will never achieve com-
mercial viability, so that capital devoted to perfecting the accuracy of their review
is money wasted. In contrast, market participants have no incentive to attack the
validity of a worthless patent. Thus, money spent on post-grant disputes will in-
volve a truly exhaustive qualitative assessment of the most valuable intellectual
property and accordingly will be well-spent.
153. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 8o6, 816
(1945).
154. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969).
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actions in having to obtain a lawyer and demonstrate to the court that he is en-
titled to an injunction are costly. Importantly, the costs so suffered exist irre-
spective of the expected validity of the owner's property right. Gradations in
that expectation will affect the extent, but not the existence, of such cost. Thus,
even where a landowner has an undisputable right to exclusive possession, that
owner rationally might pay one who threatens to trespass a sum less than the
cost of obtaining judicial relief. In short, one who observes traditional law
would likely conclude that a property owner has a right to contract with a po-
tential trespasser to preclude such trespass in the future.
A near perfect analogy to this situation has been created by some courts
with respect to prospective patent infringement. By far the best example exists
in the pharmaceutical industry. Given the compelling social need for affordable
drugs, Congress sought to enhance the availability of generics. To do so, it
passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, which created an expedited process for generic
drug manufacturers to enter markets currently being served only by pioneer
drug producers.'55 The cost of researching, developing, obtaining regulatory au-
thorization for, and commercializing a brand-name drug is infamous."56 The
Act allows generic manufacturers to bypass this protracted process and instead
submit an "abbreviated new drug application" (ANDA), which demonstrates
that the particular applicant's drug is bioequivalent with its brand-name coun-
terpart. 15 7 In doing so, an applicant can rely on safety and efficacy studies previ-
ously submitted by the brand-name drug producer.'
Some applicants file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification alleging
that the incumbent brand name drug patent is either invalid or not infringed. '5 9
This act constitutes patent infringement. 6 ° To induce the patentee to bring suit,
the Act provides that if the pioneer producer files a patent infringement suit
within forty-five days, the FDA cannot approve the generic drug for thirty
months, absent a judicial determination of invalidity or non-infringement.6 1
The Hatch-Waxman Act therefore creates a powerful conduit for generic
drug producers to enter patent-protected markets in an expeditious manner. Of
course, such entry only can take place if the incumbent's patent is found invalid
or not infringed, but-consistent with general policy highlighted above-
155. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (20o6).
156. See, e.g., Amy M. Bunker, Deadly Dose: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual
Property and Human Health, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 493, 507 (2007).
157. 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
158. See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis,
The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585,
600-04 (2003).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
161. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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Congress clearly sought to induce challenge of suspect patents by generic en-
trants.162
An intriguing and heavily divisive issue has emerged from this setting, in
which pioneer drug manufacturers have been settling infringement litigation
between themselves and generic entrants. On the face of this alone, such settle-
ment should not be of concern-the courts have promoted the myriad virtues
of the private resolution of disputes. 16 3 However, such arrangements have been
accompanied by "reverse exclusionary payments," pursuant to which brand-
name drug producers agree to pay generic entrants vast sums of money to stay
out of the relevant markets until the pertinent patents have expired.16 4
At least one court has condemned this phenomenon as per se illegal. 6 ' In In
re Cardizem, HMR, a brand-name manufacturer of Cardizem CD, and Andrx, a
potential generic manufacturer of the same drug, entered into a reverse agree-
ment166 The Sixth Circuit opined:
Andrx kept its generic product off the market and HMR paid Andrx
$89.83 million. By delaying Andrx's entry into the market, the Agree-
ment also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could
not enter until the expiration of Andrx's 18D-day period of marketing
exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer.
There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of
its other conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Card-
izem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per
se illegal restraint .... 167
162. This inference is clear from the fact that the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced
in reaction to Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), which had held that the defendant's experimental use to derive FDA-
required data infringed the pioneer drug manufacturer's patent. See also H.R.
REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647 (stat-
ing that the intent of the Act was to "make available more low cost generic
drugs"). In enacting the legislation, Congress created incentives for generic pro-
ducers to enter patent-protected markets beyond the prospect of financial return
from entry alone. In this regard, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that the first
company to file an ANDA will be granted the exclusive right to market a generic
version of the pioneer drug for one hundred and eighty days after the relevant
triggering date. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
163. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F-3 d 1323, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (discussing judicial support for settlement).
164. See generally Hemphill, supra note 2 (discussing the phenomenon of reverse ex-
clusionary payments).
165. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3 d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 907-08.
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Given the presence of intellectual property, which creates lawful monopoly, the
court obviously was wrong to characterize the agreement as a classic form of per
se illegal behavior. While market-sharing agreements are paradigmatic exam-
ples of illegal conduct, the presence of a lawful patent complicates the analysis.
Nevertheless, on the facts of In re Cardizem, there is little question that the
scope of the exclusionary agreement exceeded that of the patent, so that illegal-
ity properly followed. 6 But what of the situation in which there is a genuine
dispute as to whether a proposed generic infringes an incumbent's patent? In-
tellectual property explicitly provides its owner with the right to exclude others,
so why should that owner not be free to pay others not to infringe?
The situation, of course, is very much like the hypothetical landowner pay-
ing a prospective or actual trespasser to vacate his land. Nevertheless, there are
differences. For one, the cost to a patentee of enforcing its right is exponentially
larger than the cost to a landowner of obtaining an injunction. Indeed, patent
litigation often is characterized as the sport of kings.'6 9 On the other hand, there
is a far greater externality created by a foregone opportunity to invalidate im-
providently granted patents, given the public goods nature of information. The
ensuing question, therefore, is whether the courts should treat a patentee who
pays others not to infringe or challenge its right in the same way that they
would a real property owner in an otherwise analogous setting.
The most recent answer to this question was provided by the Federal Cir-
cuit in late 20o8. In In re Ciprofloxacin, the court held that patents create a legal
zone of exclusion. 70 It elaborated:
We conclude that in cases such as this, wherein all anticompetitive
effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power
of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the court begins its
analysis under antitrust law by applying a rule of reason approach to
evaluate the anti-competitive effects, or under patent law by analyzing
the right to exclude afforded by the patent. The essence of the inquiry
is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary
zone of the patent.17'
The Federal Circuit's holding is entirely consistent with a literal property-patent
equation. Yet, unlike the adoption of a property or liability rule, focus on that
equation is misplaced in this setting. The Federal Circuit may be criticized for
treating a highly probabilistic legal right as one would a right of conclusive and
irrefutable validity. The holder of the latter right has no ability to enhance arti-
168. This is most obviously true with regard to the generic entrant's agreement not to
relinquish its one hundred and eighty day period of exclusivity, which had the ef-
fect of ensuring that entry by other generics would be delayed.
169. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empiri-
cal Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. Rev. 1, 2 (2005).
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ficially or unilaterally the expected validity of its property in a manner that will
prove injurious to society at large. Unfortunately, the former does.
Properly viewed, then, a patentee's "zone of exclusion" is commensurate
with the legitimacy of the intellectual property protection awarded to it. In par-
ticular, treating the holder of a stochastic patent as one would the owner of a
conclusively valid property right is both incongruous and potentially danger-
ous. Doing so may allow private parties to appropriate benefits for themselves
in excess of what was intended by Congress and what was inherent in the "pat-
ent bargain." In this setting, the policymaker should approach with caution the
suggestion that patents be treated in identical fashion to realty.
Nevertheless, recognition of the probabilistic nature of patent rights con-
clusively dictates neither the legality nor the illegality of reverse exclusionary
agreements. The final analysis is complicated in particular by the presumption
of patent validity, which notably was used by the Federal Circuit to reject the
contention that courts should weigh the expected legitimacy of the patents un-
derlying the reverse agreement. 172 It also is complicated by the legitimate con-
cerns of creating optimal incentives for pharmaceutical companies that obtain
the most secure property protection society will grant them. Nevertheless, an
optimal approach requires greater sensitivity to the crucial asymmetry in the
average legitimacy of real and intellectual property.
III. CURING THE DEFICIENCY: IMPROVING THE PROSECUTION PROCESS
A. Increasing the Quality of Issued Patents
Many patents issued by the PTO are qualitatively deficient. In particular, a
dearth of pecuniary resources, an increase in the number of applications, a pro-
liferation of subject matter, examiners' inability to dispose of an unworthy ap-
plication once and for all, the nonadversarial nature of the proceeding, infor-
mation asymmetry, and the fact that an applicant does not bear the burden of
patentability combine to limit the PTO's ability to assess applications accu-
rately.' 73 The resulting deprivation in the quality of output strains the property-
patent equation and creates significant normative limitations on a patentee's
freedom of contract and right to equitable relief.
There have been numerous suggestions for reform. Professors Doug Licht-
man and Mark Lemley advocate a particularly novel idea, which focuses on
"gold-plated" patents. 74 Pursuant to their suggestions, applicants would select
one of two standards of review. Those seeking the present level of scrutiny
would have their applications assessed in much the same way as examiners in-
172. Id.
173. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
174. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 67. "Gold-plated" patents are defined as those that
are protected by unassailable presumptions of validity, which render them far
stronger (and hence more valuable) than current patents. Id. at 61-63.
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spect current applications. Unlike the present system, however, resulting pat-
ents would not benefit from an undeserved presumption of validity, which frus-
trates efficient post-grant review by the courts.'75 A second, more selective mode
of review would also be available for applicants willing to pay a premium. Such
applications also would be subject to a truly scrutinizing level of review that
would ensure that the requirements of patentability are met. The fruit of this
process would be a "gold-plated" patent, protected by a near-insurmountable
presumption of validity. Although this proposal has promise, there still are no
signs that it will evolve beyond the hypothetical.
In the short term, reexamination provides perhaps the most promising, re-
alistic solution. Unfortunately, the full potential gains of this process have yet to
be realized. Indeed, some question whether reexamination and other PTO re-
forms are likely to result in an appreciable increase in patent quality at all.' 76 In
particular, the fact that parties availing of inter partes reexamination are barred
from raising grounds of unpatentability that they "could have raised" in front of
the PTO has driven most entities away from reexamination and toward litiga-
tionYT7
Fortunately, some demonstrable gains have occurred in the past two years.
The PTO recently has taken numerous steps to improve the quality of the pros-
ecution process and has designated such improvement as a top priority 7s In
2007, it hired and trained 1215 new examiners, expanded its Patent Training
Academy to enhance new hires' training, and enhanced industry partnerships. 7
9
More importantly, during the same year the PTO introduced an accelerated ex-
amination program. Pursuant to this initiative, applicants who perform a pre-
examination search of the prior art and provide the relevant examiner with a
comparison of that search to the claimed invention can obtain a patent within a
year."' In 2008, the PTO hired an additional 1211 examiners?8' In addition, it
175. See Lemley, supra note 152, at 1523-30.
176. See Fed. Circuit's Chief Judge Doubts That PRO Reforms Will Solve Patent Litigation
Problem, 77 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 152 (Dec. 12, 2008); see also Paul
R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Where Are We
Now on Patent System Improvements and How Can We Best Make Further Pro-
gress?, Address Before the Federal Trade Commission Hearing on the Evolving IP
Marketplace (Dec. 5, 2008) (transcript available at
http://pub.bna.com/ptcj/FTCMichell20s.pdf).
177. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2006); Lois Matelan, The Continuing Controversy Over
Business Methods Patents, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 189, 205-
06 (2007).
178. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 16-19 (2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/annual/2007/2007annualreport.pdf.
179. Id.
18o. Id. at 18.
181. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note loo, at 16.
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continues to monitor the performance of its examiners through the use of qual-
ity assurance specialists."2
Of potentially great importance is the PTO's announcement in 20o8 that
the peer-to-patent initiative it launched in 2007 would be extended until June
15, 2009.183 This initiative is a serious attempt to improve the quality of issued
patents by exposing applications to direct public scrutiny. The process involves
public participation, which can take the form of uploading prior art, discussing
posted patent applications, and analyzing previously submitted references.
As noted, abuse of the continuation process has led some commentators to
question the reliability of patent prosecution18 4 To the PTO's credit, it has at-
tempted to impose limits on the number of continuations that an applicant can
seek. This has proven highly controversial and has encountered fierce resistance
from some industry representatives. The PTO's rules were enjoined through a
preliminary injunction on October 31, 2007.185 A final injunction issued on April
1, 2008.1s6 For the time being, efforts to prevent abuse of the continuation proc-
ess have been stymied.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence of improvement in the prosecution
process. In particular, the PTO's allowance rate has declined dramatically in the
last five years.' Not all agree, however, that the patent grant rate is an appro-
priate metric by which to judge the quality of issued patents.' In particular,
this reduction may have been counteracted largely by an increase in Requests
for Continued Examination (RCEs), rather than translating into a meaningful
decrease in the abandonment rate.18 9
182. As an interesting aside, the Federal Circuit recently affirmed the PTO's right to
fire a quality assurance specialist, whose job it was to review examiner decisions
for error but who was found through a sample of his cases to have erred in more
than 35% of them. See Pal v. Dep't of Commerce, 3Ol F. App'x 984 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
183. Press Release, U.S Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Extends and Expands
Peer Review Pilot (July 16, 20o8), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/
speeches/o8-26.htm.
184. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Lemley & Moore, supra note
107.
185. See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007).
186. See Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 20o8).
187. See, e.g., D. Christopher Ohly et al., It Is Not So Obvious: The Impact of KSR on Pa-
tent Prosecution, Licensing, and Litigation, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 286 (2oo8).
188. See Ron D. Katznelson, Bad Science in Search of "Bad" Patents, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 1,
1, 24-28 (2008).
189. RCEs occur under 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2oo6), pursuant to which an applicant can
seek further examination of a rejected application. Under current standards-and
despite the PTO's unsuccessful efforts to limit the number of continuations-the
PTO can never issue a literally "final" rejection. See Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (en-
joining the PTO's attempt to limit the number of continuations, RCEs, and divi-
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In November of 2008, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI) in Ex parte Miyazaki lowered the threshold of ambiguity employed by
the PTO to require an applicant to define its claims with greater specificity. '9
More specifically, the BPAI held:
[W]e employ a lower threshold of ambiguity when reviewing a pending
claim for indefiniteness than those used by post-issuance reviewing
courts. In particular, rather than requiring that the claims are insolubly
ambiguous, we hold that if a claim is amenable to two or more plausi-
ble claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the appli-
cant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed in-
vention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite. 91
This is an important decision. The claims of a patent define the invention.' 9
Therefore, any equivocation in the claims translates into a concomitant ambi-
guity in the scope of exclusivity. The Federal Circuit's standard requires that a
claim be "insolubly ambiguous"-a standard doubtless derived in part from the
presumption of validity attaching to every patent granted by the PTO.a93 Of
course, the PTO is subject to no such presumption, even in a setting of reex-
amination. 94 The BPAI's ruling thus makes some sense and allows the PTO to
reduce the indeterminacy of issued patents. Before the decision, claims subject
to multiple plausible constructions-shown above to be a major contributor to
the indeterminacy of patent rights-were not indefinite. This legal principle fa-
cilitated a situation in which potential infringers lack effective means to assess
whether they are in fact infringing and, moreover, whether the relevant claims
are anticipated under the prior art. This, of course, contributes to the stochastic
nature of IP enforcement and undermines the right to exclude, which is meant
to define such property. As noted, this limitation serves not only to undermine
the cause for injunctive relief in the case of alleged infringement but also to im-
plicate the validity of derivative contractual rights. As the PTO continues to en-
hance the quality of its determinations, and hence the expected validity and de-
terminacy of the patents it issues, the case for a more literal property-patent
equation becomes stronger.
sional applications). Disappointed applicants can continue to seek examination as
many times as they choose.
19o. Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207 (BPAI Nov. 19, 20o8), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/prec/fdo733oo.pdf.
191. Id. at 1211.
192. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3 d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("It is a 'bedrock
principle' of patent law that 'the claims of a patent define the invention to which
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude."' (quoting Innova/Pure Water. Inc., v.
Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3 d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
193. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1OO,
1022 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
194. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 67.
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Surveying some of these developments, Professor Epstein-one of the lead-
ing proponents of the property rights movement-recently opined that im-
provements in the prosecution process could lead to eBay's being overturned. 95
Irrespective of whether this turns out to be the case, it surely remains true that
genuine, sustained improvement in the prosecution process would have a
marked impact on the construction of optimal patent rules.
B. Residual Uncertainty and Implications
The prosecution process never will be perfect; it never will achieve a level of
reliability that would eliminate entirely the bad-patent dilemma. The sheer
vastness of the prior art, in conjunction with the ever-increasing complexity of
technology, will ensure that some residual error will persist. At the same time,
the lure of the private market will continue to entice the best examiners, which
complicates recruiting and retention. It is doubtless that additional difficulties
will persist. Perfection is an unattainable goal.
Some residual indeterminism is therefore inevitable. The relevant question,
though, is this: What are the normative repercussions of that uncertainty on the
property-patent equation, a patentee's ability to obtain injunctive relief, and its
freedom to enter into contractual arrangements that implicate policy issues sur-
rounding the exclusivity of its property right?
The purpose of this Section is to clarify what is inherent in the preceding
analysis. The fact of indeterminism has distinct and appreciable repercussions
for the property-patent equation, though the precise nature of such conse-
quences depends largely on degree. This Article has considered two major issues
associated with the property rights movement; namely, whether property or li-
ability rules should govern instances of patent infringement, and whether the
questionable validity and imprecise scope of many patents should constrain pa-
tentees' freedom of contract. In both settings, the probabilistic nature of patents
is far more pronounced than is the case with regard to physical property. Nev-
ertheless, conventional principles of property law have some instructive value in
cases of patent infringement. These principles make clear that objectively inde-
terminate property borders may lead to inadvertent and economically unavoid-
able trespass in cases where the relevant property owner does not provide no-
tice. In such situations, property rules should give way to a liability solution. A
similar analogy can be applied to patent jurisprudence.
What if the prosecution process improves in the manner envisaged above?
As the expected validity of patents granted by the PTO increases, a priori skepti-
cism should retreat. The normative case for a liability rule will diminish in par-
allel with enhanced patent quality. An infringer's right to posit that her in-
fringement was both inadvertent and unavoidable decreases in direct
proportion to the qualitative performance of the PTO during prosecution. In
short, the more secure the property right, the greater the case for injunctive re-
195. See Richard Epstein, Op-Ed., Breaking the Patent Logjam, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/bfo55c78-75o8-l1dd-ab3o-oooo779fdl8c.html.
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lief.'96 There is thus strong ground for Professor Epstein's contention that im-
provements in the prosecution process could lead to a retraction of eBay.
Although improved certainty would enhance a patentee's claim for injunc-
tive relief, the larger effect surely would lie in freedom of contract. Section III.C
explored how unconstrained patentees would, and do, regulate the validity of
their intellectual property by reaching mutually beneficial arrangements with
rivals. By foreclosing those most likely to challenge the validity of their exclusive
rights, such patentees artificially elevate the exclusive force of their intellectual
property rights. In the conventional setting of land, where rights are relatively
deterministic, the ability of a property owner to pay others not to trespass is
unquestioned. Yet, as explored, the uncertain nature of patents severely compli-
cates the question of whether a patentee should have equivalent contractual
freedom.
As the PTO improves the prosecution process, the case for drawing a literal
patent-property equation with regard to reverse exclusionary payments will
grow stronger. A patentee's right to agree with others not to challenge the valid-
ity of its patent is proportional to the expected legitimacy of its intellectual
property. As that property grows more secure, the Federal Circuit's focus on a
"zone of exclusion" that legitimizes otherwise improper conduct will become
increasingly desirable.
In sum, potential improvements in the PTO's procedures offer the possibil-
ity of resolving the difficulties imposed by indeterminism on the property-
patent equation. Although patents of unquestionable legitimacy will prove elu-
sive, significant improvements in prosecution will result in a strong founda-
tional backing for a close property-patent equation. Were such advances to take
place, heuristic concerns would favor treating rights of strong expected validity
largely as sacrosanct. As a result, prosecution need not be flawless to bring an
analogy between real and intellectual property to its logical limit.
CONCLUSION
The property rights movement has been criticized for promoting a dog-
matic and ideological analogy between intellectual and physical property. Crit-
ics object in particular to the improper extraction of formalistic rights to ex-
clude from the traditional setting.' 97 Given the numerous idiosyncrasies of the
intellectual domain, some view the idea of a "property" right within it as incon-
gruous and misleading.' 98 A person's right to injunctive relief against invasion
of his land is distinct from a patentee's right to prevent others from practicing
her invention. In particular, the former setting involves private goods that are
196. Obviously, concerns of patent trolling, as facilitated through sequential invest-
ment and fragmented ownership, would persist, but the normative ground for
denying injunctive relief on the basis of indeterminism would be eviscerated.
197. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 25.
198. Id.
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subject to rivalry in consumption-the normative case for exclusion is stronger
when trespass directly impairs the owner's use or enjoyment of his property. 99
More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high-
tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions
of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore-
closes innovation.2 " One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a sin-
gle patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that impli-
cates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities."' Given such
distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as
sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy.
Yet, this view is myopic. Particularly from a utilitarian perspective, there is
much in common between these two fields. Exclusivity is justified in both situa-
tions to spur optimal investment in resources and to allocate valuable goods ef-
ficiently. Though significant distinctions do exist between the intellectual and
physical worlds, these differences are both readily observable and relatively con-
tained. More importantly still, those ostensible discrepancies in fact yield valu-
able insights into the formulation of optimal policy. The realm of traditional
property law is far less homogeneous in providing exclusion rights than a cur-
sory glance would suggest. Similarly, the right to injunctive relief in that setting
is considerably less sacrosanct than many believe. Indeed, several cutting prob-
lems in the intellectual arena-sequential investment, ex post hold-out, and
high transaction cost settings-find direct analogy in the traditional realm. Al-
though these issues may be more pronounced in the patent field, the policy
foundations are closely related. Ultimately, courts are eminently capable of dis-
tinguishing issues unique to a particular intellectual property matter from a
garden variety case of trespass in traditional property law. What distinctions do
exist, therefore, are contained.
The issue of uncertainty constitutes a potentially glaring exception. For
those who would promote the cause of a property-patent equation, the systemic
indeterminism that underlies all patent grants constitutes a point of marked
departure from the world of traditional property. Patentees possess stochastic
rights only-ones that would seem to render toothless a foundational analogy
between the physical and intellectual domains. In particular, how can one com-
pare a landowner's right to eject a trespasser from his land to a patentee's right
to injunctive relief in a setting of indeterminate infringement that only becomes
evident ex post? One who possesses a probabilistic property right should not
enjoy the same exclusivity as one whose ownership is unquestioned. Given the
vast disparity in both expected validity and clarity in scope, the fact of stochasti-
cism has significant implications for the property rights movement.
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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Yet, this Article argues that patent uncertainty, seemingly a point of irrec-
oncilable divergence from traditional property, in fact bears a complex and po-
tentially helpful relationship to the law of real property. Going to the heart of
the property-patent equation-namely, the extent to which the law of real
property can be used to justify injunctive relief in the case of patent infringe-
ment-traditional property doctrine bears the potential for most desirable ap-
plication in the new economy. Although the indefiniteness associated with in-
tellectual property is far more pronounced than what may be associated with
realty, the law governing the latter provides some normative guidance.
Most paradigmatically, inadvertent trespass onto another's land-coupled
with sunk investment and nebulous boundaries-may lead to the imposition of
a liability rule and the loss of a right to injunctive relief for the property owner.
Sound reasoning underlies this element of the law, and it would seem no less
applicable to the world of IP. Where an infringer has conducted a meaningful
search, where the omitted patent, which is neither licensed nor marketed, is lost
amongst thousands in an impenetrable thicket, and where the patent's indeter-
minate claims-even had they been discovered-would have lead a potential
infringer to conclude as a matter of probability that its planned activity is non-
infringing, analogy to the law of real property would similarly suggest the im-
plementation of a liability rule. Allowing a non-practicing patentee to enjoin
the activity of an innocent infringer following massive investment by the latter
creates perverse incentives, inefficiencies, and wealth transfers of questionable
desirability.
The fact of indeterminism is central to this inquiry, for if an infringer had
means by which to demarcate the extent of others' proprietary ownership ex
ante, strong rights to exclude ex post would induce potential infringers to enter
into efficient licensing arrangements before they begin commercialization. So
construed, the recent phenomenon of maintaining deliberate ignorance of the
prior art would provide no ground for denying an injunction to the holder of
an infringed patent. One can appreciate that traditional principles of property
law are readily applicable to contemporary issues in the realm of patents, not-
withstanding the unique level of uncertainty underlying the latter.
The foregoing reveals an important point-the ubiquity of probabilistic pa-
tents strains an analogy between physical and intellectual property only if one
characterizes the law of real property as entailing dogmatic and unqualified
rights to exclude. Such obviously is not the case.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the property-patent equation. In par-
ticular, the extent of the divergence in certainty necessitates distinct legal stan-
dards covering owners' freedom of contract. In this sense, a patentee's "right to
exclude" implicates not only his right to injunctive relief but also the justifica-
tion for contractual arrangements that might otherwise be constrained as a
matter of public policy. Perhaps the most central constraint is created by anti-
trust law. Recognizing patent law as an exception to the long-established rule
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against monopolies,"' many courts have found anticompetitive behavior within
the scope of a patent as immune from antitrust oversight." 3 The legitimacy of
this view would seem to be affected heavily by the nature of the underlying
property right. In particular, the greater the certainty of a patentee's temporary
monopoly, the greater the legal case for allowing her to engage in exclusionary
behavior within the purview of her grant.
Given current standards of legitimacy, however, significant policy concerns
are implicated by a patentee's ability to enhance artificially the certainty of its
exclusive right. More specifically, private, artificial enhancement of a patent
right results in a windfall gain for the relevant patentee but no corresponding
boon for social welfare. Although society unquestionably should pursue the
goal of improving the expected validity of patent rights, the way to achieve this
is by enhancing the quality of the prosecution process. The owner of a probabil-
istic patent is not entitled to the full profit that would accompany a property
right of unquestionable validity precisely because its exclusive right is derived
from a flawed process. Treating such IP rights as sacrosanct confers an un-
earned benefit on inventors who may not properly have qualified for protec-
tion.
The Federal Circuit's conclusion in In re Ciprofloxacin initially seems con-
sistent with a property-patent equation. Were a trespasser to occupy part of
one's land, no one would question one's right to pay him to leave. Enforcing
one's right in court necessarily involves expense, so such an arrangement may
be eminently desirable from the perspective of the property owner. Such is also
the case with a patentee, who is faced with the prospect of litigating infamously
expensive claims of infringement and invalidity.0 4 Even the holder of a conclu-
sively valid patent would pay a premium to a challenger to avoid judicial costs.
Yet, the weakness of the analogy is apparent. While there may be some un-
certainty as to the precise metes and bounds of a particular lot, the question of
whether the holder of the relevant freehold or leasehold interest has a legitimate
right typically will be straightforward. Obviously, the equivalent question in the
intellectual domain leads to a different answer. The Federal Circuit's focus on a
"zone of exclusion" can be criticized for treating a probabilistic right as being
tantamount to a conclusive one. A reverse agreement may protect a patent that
would be found invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed in court. This policy
insight is far from esoteric-the courts have long stressed the importance of in-
validating improvidently granted IP rights." 5 In re Ciprofloxacin may be con-
strued as drawing an uncritical analogy to principles of traditional property law
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and, in doing so, allowing a patentee to extract greater social wealth than was
inherent in the patent bargain.
The (presently) inescapable fact of suspect patent validity thus has signifi-
cant repercussions for those who favor the direct implementation of rules estab-
lished long before in the physical realm. While the latter body of law does in-
deed display sensitivity and prudence in the presence of uncertain property
boundaries-thus offering a rich body of law from which the IP policymaker
can draw-the property-patent equation is not unqualified. Nevertheless,
courts and commentators generally should promote property rules in the patent
law setting, thus creating optimal incentives for initial invention, commerciali-
zation, and ex ante negotiation, where that context accommodates such a rule.
Here, conventional principles of property law would seem most instructive, giv-
en their implementation of a liability solution only in the presence of preclusive
transaction costs, innocent trespass coupled with sunk investment, or ex post
hold-out." 6
206. See POSNER, supra note 52, at 55.
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